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INTRODUCTION
[F]aith is woven into their business. It is reflected in what they sell, in
how they advertise, in how they treat employees, in how much they give
to charity, and in the one day ofthe week when their stores are closed. In a
profound way, their business is a ministry.
UNDED and privately held by CEO David Green and his family, Hobby
Lobby is one of the nation's leading arts and crafts chains, operating over
500 stores in forty-one states with more than 13,000 fill-time employees who
are eligible for health insurance coverage.' Despite its tremendous success,
Hobby Lobby is currently in the midst of a battle to preserve its religious
liberty.s
In September 2012, Hobby Lobby and a Christian bookstore chain,
Mardel, filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Oklahoma, challenging on
various religious grounds the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's
(PPACA)6 requirement that insurance provided by employers include coverage
for women's preventive screenings and health care, including contraception, at
no additional cost to employees.7 Green has spoken about his family's dilemma,
I Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PPACA].
2 J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. in History, 2011, Centre
College. The author sincerely thanks M. Stephen Pitt and Thomas E. Rutledge for their guidance
support throughout the writing process.
3 Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Opening Brief in Support at I, Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 E Supp. 2d 1278 (2012) (No. CIV-12-Iooo-HE), 2012 WL 5851136.
4 Tim Talley, Hobby Lobby Sues over Health Care Reform Mandate to Cover Morning-After Pill,
HUFFINGTON Post (Sept. 12, 2012, 5:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2o12/0 9/2/hobby-
lobby-morning-after-pilln-18788 73 .html.
5 Pastor Rick Warren on Hobby Lobby Lawsuit, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUs LIBERTY (Jan.
4, 2013) [hereinafter Warren on Hobby Lobby], http://www.becketfund.org/pastor-rick-warrens-
on-hobby-lobby-lawsuit/.
6 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 00, 124 Stat.
119,131-32 (2010) (codified as part of'Public Health Service Act at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-I3 (2012)).
7 See Steve Clark, Laborers' Health & Safety Fund of N. Am., PPACA Mandates Preventive
Care; Women's Provisions Stir Debate, LIFELINES ONLINE (Sept. 20n), http://www.lhsfna.org/index.
cfm/lifelines/september-2oni/ppaca-mandates-preventivecare/.
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explaining that, "[b]y being required to make a choice between sacrificing
our faith [and] paying millions of dollars in fines, we essentially must choose
which poison pill to swallow."' Indeed, with 13,000 employees and a proposed
fine of $100 per employee per day, Hobby Lobby's failure to comply with
the mandate would equate to $1.3 million in daily fines.' Following the U.S.
Supreme Court's denial of a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of
the contraception-coverage requirement on December 26, 2012,10 the Green
family released a statement disclosing its intent to defy the law despite the
significant fines.n
Hobby Lobby is representative of the numerous religious employers across
the United States who have filed lawsuits challenging the PPACAs contraceptive
mandate. Although the majority of these cases have been dismissed in the
district courts for various procedural reasons, a few have made their way to the
federal courts of appeals.12 Regarding the Hobby Lobby lawsuit, Pastor Rick
Warren commented:
I predict that the battle to preserve religious liberty for all ... will likely
become the civil rights movement of this decade. If it takes a popular
movement to reign in overreaching government, then Hobby Lobb 's
courageous stand, in the face of enormous pressure and fines, will likely be
considered the Birmingham bus boycott .... Regardless of your faith, you
should pay attention to this landmark case, and pray for a clear victory for
freedom of conscience.13
Due to the numerous lawsuits filed and extensive media coverage of the
contraceptive mandate controversy, the U.S. Supreme Court is likely to weigh
in on the issue in the near future. But this Note does not attempt to make a
decisive determination as to the constitutionality of the mandate. Rather, it seeks
to identify discrepancies in the scarce precedent the U.S. Supreme Court has at
its disposal, emphasize the criticism the current religious employer exemption
has received. Ultimately, this Note argues that the religious exemption should
be broadened to afford protection to certain religiously affiliated institutions
that currently fail to qualify as "religious employers" under the current final
interim rule amendment.14
8 Talley, supra note 4.
9 Ely Portillo, Hobby Lobby PresidentExpects Long Court Battle over Federal Contraceptives Man-
date, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Jan. IS, 2013), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2013/oI/I8/3795864/
hobby-lobby-president-expects.html.
so Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643 (2012).
in Neetzan Zimmerman, Hobby Lobby Willing to Pay a Million Dollars a Day to Avoid Provid-
ing Employees with Coveragefor Emergency Contraception, GAWKER (Dec. 28, 2012, 4:41 PM), http://
gawker.com/597855/hobby-lobby-willing-to-pay-a-million-dollars-a-day-to-avoid-providing-
employees-with-coverage-for-emergency-contraception.
12 Next Wave ofACA Lawsuits Challenges Contraceptive Mandate, 23 no. 3 MD. EMP. L. LET-
TER 5 (2012). See Annex Med., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-m118, 2013 WL 1276025 (8th Cit. Feb. I, 2013);
Newland v. Sebelius, No. 12-1380, 20I3 WL 5481997 (ioth Cir. Oct. 3, 2013).
13 Warren on Hobby Lobby, supra note 5.
14 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Set-
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This is the crux of the problem: the interim final rule's definition of"religious
employer"excludes from exemption millions ofreligious organizations providing
invaluable services to the general public-hospitals, soup kitchens, and school
institutions-simply because they are not churches or church institutions."s
While a moderate expansion of the religious employer exemption to some
nonprofit entities would afford exemption to certain religiously affiliated
universities and hospitals, it would not fily address the public concern with
the current exemption.The court should look past the artificial nonprofit buffer
to provide exemptions to for-profit organizations-especially non-publicly
traded, closely held corporations like Hobby Lobby-that are owned by people
whose freedom to conduct their business in harmony with their religious beliefs
is trampled upon by the contraceptive mandate.
Part I of this Note traces the background and development of section 2713
of the PPACA. Part II discusses the popular variations of exemptions to state-
mandated prescription contraceptive coverage in comparison to the exemption
adopted by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS ).16 As part
of this discussion, Part II briefly outlines the only two state high court decisions
that have dealt with the issue of contraceptive mandates and identifies various
weak points in the opinions that undermine their value as "precedent" for
the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in Catholic Charities of Sacramento v.
Superior Court, the California Supreme Court merely skimmed the surface of
eight constitutional challenges asserted by a nonprofit organization in order to
avoid an undoubtedly lengthy, but adequate and fair assessment of the claims.' 7
Similarly, in Catholic Charities of the Diocese ofAlbany v. Serio, the New York
Court of Appeals was sharply dismissive of the plaintiff's claims.'" Part II
describes the nationwide discontent with the current exemption and identifies
the potential economic and regulatory consequences of limiting it to such a
narrow scope.
Finally, Part III justifies the need for a broader exemption. First, it advocates
for passage of the "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" (NPRM) announced
February 1,2013, by the Department of Health and Human Services intended
to moderately broaden the scope of the religious employer exemption to the
PPACA to reach certain nonprofit organizations.' 9 Part III also argues for
vices Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. i, 2012)
[hereinafter Interim Final Rules].
15 See 45 C.F.R. § I47 . 3 o(a)(iv)(B) (2012); see also Interim Final Rules, supra note 14, at 8728.
16 Charged with promulgating regulations under the PPACA, the Department of Health and
Human Services is the U.S. government's principal agency in charge of health care and the provi-
sion of health services. See generally http://www.hhs.gov/about/.
17 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P 3 d 67 (Cal. 2004).
18 See Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 20o6).
19 See Patricia Zapor, HHS Issues Proposed Rules on Exemptions from Contraceptive Coverage,
CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE (last updated Feb. I, 2013), http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/
cns/I3oo438. See also Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 8456, 8459 (proposed Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.ER. pt. 147) [hereinafter Pro-
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further expansion of those proposed rules to ensure that Christian for-profit
organizations like Hobby Lobby are not forced to comply with a law that goes
against their religious beliefs.
I. HISTORY OF THE PPACA
A. Early Attempts at a Federal Coverage Mandate
The PPACA was signed into law on March 23, 2010 by the Obama
Administration, ending a series of failed attempts to pass federal contraceptive
coverage legislation.20 Though access to prescription contraceptives has been
available for years, employer-sponsored health insurance plans have rarely
covered them. 21 And while the PPACA represents the first time that the federal
rules have stipulated that preventive services must be covered, previous federal
action has been interpreted as a "de jure requirement" of coverage.22
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, arguably the most prominent of such
action, was enacted in response to a controversial 1976 court ruling. In General
Electric Company v. Gilbert, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employer's
disability benefits plan did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964
in its failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities. 23 In that case, the company
repeatedly refused to extend disability benefits to their employees' pregnancy-
related work absences. 24 All other nonoccupational sickness accidents, however,
were covered by the company's disability plan.25 Justice Rehnquist, for the
majority, found that the company disability plan did not violate Title VII,
since there was no showing that the exclusion of pregnancy disability benefits
posed Rules of February 2013].
20 PPACA, supra note I, at § 2713; see, e.g., Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive
Coverage Act of 2007, H.R. 2412, ioth Cong. (ist Sess. 2007); see also Insurance Coveragefor Contra-
ception: A Proven Way to Protect and Promote Women's Health, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND.
4 (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/files/birth-control-insurance-coverage.
pdf (detailing unsuccessful litigation and legislative attempts for federal contraceptive-equity laws
prior to enactment of the PPACA).
21 See CYNTHIA DAILARD, THE COST OF CONTRACEPTIVE INSURANCE COVERAGE, GUTT-
MACHER REP. ON PUB. PoL'Y 2 (2003), available at https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/o6/i/
gro60112.html ("Historically, private-sector insurance in the United States has failed to provide
adequate coverage of prescription contraceptives.").
22 Chad Brooker, Comment, Making Contraception Easier to Swallow: Background and Reli-
gious Challenges to the HHS Rule Mandating Coverage of Contraceptives, 1z U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELI-
GION, GENDER & CLASS 169, 181 (2012).
23 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
24 Id. at 129.
25 Id. at 128.
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was a pretext "designed to effect invidious [sex] discrimination."26 In response,
Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), amending
Title VII "to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. "27
The intended effects of the PDA were immediately called into question
in 1998, when, "[w]ithin weeks of hitting the U.S. market, more than half of
Viagra prescriptions received health insurance coverage. "28 Consequently, many
women's rights activists began to demand answers as to whether the PDA
did in fact contemplate contraception coverage. 29 Many argued that it was
unreasonable to cover treatment of male sexual dysfunction without providing
for coverage that would reduce the number of unwanted pregnancies. 0 As one
newspaper writer exclaimed, "the fury over Viagra may have given the fight for
contraception covered under insurance plans just the momentum it needed."31
Then, in 2000, it seemed that women's rights activists got the response they
had hoped for when the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) issued a decision announcing that employers must cover the expenses
of prescription contraceptives to the same extent that they cover the expenses of
other types of drugs and preventive care.32 Interestingly, much of the EEOC's
reasoning reflected the arguments made by the dissenters in Gilbert and those
adopted by Congress when it passed the PDA.33 But, while influential to the
agency's enforcement ofTitle VII, an EEOC decision lacks the force of law.34 In
fact, the Eighth Circuit effectively disregarded it in In re Union Pacfic Railroad
26 Id. at 134 36.
27 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe(k) (2042)).
28 Geraldine Sealey, Erections Get Insurance; Why Not the Pill?, ABCNEWS (June 19, 2002),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/storyid=9 538; see Laura Meckler, EEOC Preventive Insurance Includes
Contraceptives,ABCNEWS (Dec.14,2000), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=117763&page=i.
29 See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L.
REV. 363,373 (1998) (explaining that the PDAs prohibition naturally applies to employee benefits,
including health insurance coverage, "because health insurance and other fringe benefits are 'com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.').
30 Contraceptive Equity Bills Gain Momentum in State Legislatures, CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE
RTs. (Aug. I, 2005), http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/contraceptive-equity-bills-gain-
momentum-in-state-legislatures.
31 Sealey, supra note 28.
32 EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: COMMISSION DECISION ON COVERAGE OF CONTRA-
CEPTION (Dec. 14, 2000), available at Westlaw, 2000 WL 33407187.
33 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 149 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Surely it
offends common sense to suggest ... that a classification revolving around pregnancy is not, at the
minimum, strongly 'sex related.'"); see also id. at r62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that special
treatment of pregnancy is sex discrimination because it is "the capacity to become pregnant which
primarily differentiates the female from the male.").
34 E.g., In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp. Practices Litig., 378 E Supp. 2d ii39, 1143 (D. Neb. 2005),
rev'd on other grounds, 479 E3d 936 (8th Cir. 2007) ("The EEOC's policy is not binding on this
Court, but is entitled to some deference, because the EEOC is the administrative body responsible
for enforcement of Title VII and the PDA.").
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Employment Practices Litigation" when it ruled that exclusion of all prescription
contraception from coverage under an employee health insurance plan does not
constitute gender discrimination against female employees and thus does not
violate Title VII as amended by the PDA."6
In a final attempt to give the 2000 EEOC decision legal significance
(and possibly in direct response to In re Union Pacfc), Senator Reid and
Representative Slaughter, both democrats, simultaneously introduced the
Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Act "to require . . .
coverage of prescription contraceptive drugs and devices and contraceptive
services under health plans."" However, like its predecessor, the Putting
Prevention First Act of 2004," the bill failed to gain passage. Both bills would
have mandated full coverage without cost sharing and with no exemptions for
religious institutions.39
B. The Institute ofMedicine (IOM) Report and HHS Decision
Generally, the PPACA represents an effort to provide health coverage to the
majority of Americans.40 While that objective itself has been under significant
political scrutiny,41 the provision mandating coverage of contraceptives as part
of preventive care for women is the subject of the most recent debate-a debate
with its deepest roots in religious, rather than political, ideology.42
The controversial women's preventive care provision nearly did not exist.
In fact, it was not included in the original draft of the PPACA.43 Rather, this
35 In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp. Practices Litig., 479 F 3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2007).
36 See id.
37 Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 2oo7, H.R. 2412, ioth
Cong. (ist Sess. 2007); Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 2007,
S. 3o68, nroth Cong. (2d Sess. 2oo8).
38 Putting Prevention First Act of 2004, H.R. 4192, lo8th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004); Putting
Prevention First Act of 2004, S. 2336, io8th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004).
39 Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 2007, H.R. 2412, Ioth
Cong. §§ 3-4 (Ist Sess. 2007); Putting Prevention First Act of 2004, H.R. 4192, ro8th Cong. §§
30-04 (2d Sess. 2004).
40 Elizabeth J. Bondurant & Steven D. Henry, Constitutional Challenges to the Patient Protec-
tion andAffordable CareAct, 78 DEF. COUNS.J. 249, 249 (20u) ("The PPACA focuses on reform of
the health insurance market and attempts to provide better coverage for those with pre-existing
conditions and improved prescription drug coverage in Medicare. . . . However, its most notable
and far reaching legislative mandate is its requirement that each American purchase health insur-
ance."); see, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks at Signing of PPACA (Mar. 23, 2010), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-and-vice-president-signing
health-insurance-reform-bill.
41 Bondurant & Henry, supra note 40 ("The PPACA has produced strong emotions across the
political spectrum.").
42 See Jennifer Haberkorn & Kathryn Smith, ACA Now Faces Contraception Test, POLITIcO,
(Nov. 9, 2012, 4:41 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/III2/83599.html.
43 Adam Sonfield, Contraception: An Integral Component of Preventative Care for Wom-
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key provision was added in response to recommendations offered by the U.S.
Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) regarding the frequency and type of
preventive care individuals should be entitled to receive."'Ihe Women's Health
Amendment (WHA) filled the gaps in the USPSTF's recommendations by
requiring the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to identify
a fourth category of services that should be covered: women's preventive care
and screening. 45 The WHA was introduced by Senator Barbara Mikulski and
passed on December 3, 2009-making it the first amendment voted on and
passed in the Senate during the health reform legislative process."
Under the added WHA provisions, HHS was required to propose
comprehensive and evidence-based guidelines for women's preventative health
coverage.47 In order to promulgate such guidelines, HHS Secretary Kathleen
Sebelius requested that a panel of experts convened by the Institute of Medicine
(1M) "review the science and make recommendations for what women's
en, GUTTMACHER PoL'Y REV., Spring 2010, at 2, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/
gpr/I3/2/gprz30202.html.
44 The USPSTF is an independent panel of nonfederal health experts, including primary
care providers, health behavior specialists, and methodologists. "Its mission is twofold: (I) assess
the benefits and harms of preventive services for people asymptomatic for the target condition
on the basis of age, gender, and risk factors for disease; and (2) make recommendations about
which preventive services should be incorporated into routine primary care practice." COMM.
ON PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN, INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR
WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 29 (20I) [hereinafter IOM Report].
45 See Denying Coverage of Contraceptives Harms Women, NATL WOMEN's LAW CTR. (Aug. 23,
2012), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/fs-on-the-relig-exempt-to cc-withoutcost-
sharing.november_20II.pdf. The WIHA additions to PPACA § 2713 provide the following:
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health
insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose any
cost sharing requirements for-
(i) evidence-based items or services that have in effect a rating of'A or 'B'in the current
recommendations of the United States Preventive Services ask Force;
(2) immunizations that have in effect a recommendation from the Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention with
respect to the individual involved; and
(3) with respect to infants, children, and adolescents, evidence-informed preventive care
and screenings provided for in the comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health
Resources and Services Administration. [And]
(4) with respect to women, such additional preventive care and screenings not described
in paragraph (i) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health
Resources and Services Administration for purposes of this paragraph.
PPACA,supra note i, at § iooi (codified as part of Public Health Service Act at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-I3
(2012)).
46 Press Release, Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski, Mikulski Puts Women First in Health Care Re-
form Debate: Senator Introduces First Amendment to Senate Health Care Reform Bill to Guar-
antee Women Access to Preventive Health Screenings and Care at No Cost (Nov.30, 2009), http://
www.mikulski.senate.gov/media/pressrelease/ii-30-2009-2.cfm.
47 Rebecca Hall, Comment, 7he Women's Healtb Amendment and Religious Freedom: Finding a
Sufficient Compromise, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 401, 407 (2012).
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preventive health services should be covered." 48 The IOM Committee, acting
as the scientific resource for HHS's final coverage rule, focused on diseases
and conditions more common in women than in men.49 Between November
2010 and May 2011, the IOM Committee held three informative meetings
on preventive services for women and "gathered extensive information on
numerous topics related to health and health care services for women."s0 It held
public forums in which women's health organizations, national health interest
groups, and other experts issued statements to the Committee on the latest
developments in their respective fields.s'
Perhaps most significant in its findings was the fact that contraception and
contraceptive counseling were not included in the range of preventive services
available to women under the PPACA.52 Therefore, in July of 2011, the IOM
published its final report, "Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing
the Gaps,"where it recommended for consideration as a preventive service for
women, among other things,"the full range of Food and Drug Administration-
approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education
and counseling for women with reproductive capacity." 3
However, per the WHA's instruction, the IOM's recommendations had to
be "supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration" (HRSA)
before they could be implemented.5 4 After presentation, the HRSA adopted
them in large part on August 1, 2011.ss Consequently, new health plans had to
include, inter alia, "FDA-approved contraception methods and contraceptive
counseling" without cost sharing for "insurance policies with plan years
beginning on or after August 1, 2012."s6
48 Press Release, Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski, Mikulski Applauds Adoption of IOM Guide-
lines for Women's Preventive Health (Aug. a, 2011), http://www.mikulski.senate.gov/media/press-
release/8-r-zonr-x.cfm.
49 Id
50 IOM Report, supra note 44, at 22-23.
51 Id. at 23.
52 Id. at to9. As support for its following recommendation (Recommendation 5.5), the IOM
Report cited evidence that
contraception and contraceptive counseling are effective at reducing unintended preg-
nancies. Current federal reimbursement policies provide coverage for contraception
and contraceptive counseling and most private insurers also cover contraception in their
health plans. Numerous health professional associations recommend family planning
services as part of preventive care for women. Furthermore, a reduction in unintended
pregnancies has been identified as a specific goal in [HHS published strategic initia-
tives] Healthy People 20o and Healthy People 2020.
Id. (citation omitted).
53 Id. at bo9-io. Ihis is formally labeled "Recommendation 55" in the IOM Report.
54 See Adam Marks, Student Article, Good Health and Low Costs: Why the PPACA's Preventive
Care Provisions May Not Produce Expected Outcomes, 23 Lov. CONSUMER L. REV. 486, 488-89 (2s).
55 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Affordable Care Act Ensures
Women Receive Preventive Services at No Additional Cost (Aug. 1, 2on1), http://www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2oupres/8/2onio8ob.html.
5 6 Id.
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C. Formation ofthe Religious Employer Exemption and the Accommodation
After the interim final regulations (which included the IOM's
recommendations) were publicized, HHS requested public comments and
received considerable feedback on the list of specific preventive services for
women that should be covered under § 2713(a)(4).17 While many commenters
supported the inclusion of contraceptive services for all women with no
exemptions, others stressed that requiring religious employers' group health
plans to cover services "that their faith deems contrary to its religious tenets"
would encroach upon their religious freedom." Some religious employers
do not currently cover contraceptive services in their plans for precisely that
reason.59
In response to the negative feedback, HHS found it "appropriate that
HRSA, in issuing these Guidelines, take[] into account the effect on the
religious beliefs of certain religious employers if coverage of contraceptive
services were required in the group health plans in which employees in certain
religious positions participate. "60 The interim final rules were thus amended
to provide the HRSA increased discretion to exempt religious employers
from compliance with its guidelines respecting the provision of contraceptive
services.61
After incorporating HRSAs recommendations, HHS's proposed
amendment to the final interim rules provided that:
[F]or purposes of this policy, a religious employer is one that: (1) [hlas the
inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employs persons
who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves persons who s are its
religious tenets; and (4) is a non-profit organization under [certain sections
of the Internal Revenue Code which] refer to churches, their integrated
auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches, as well as to the
exclusively religious activities of any religious order.
62
The exemption was narrow to say the least. One commentator has called
it "the narrowest religious exemption ever adopted in federal law."63 HHS
57 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug.
3, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.z30(a)(iv)(B) (2012)) [hereinafter Amendments to Interim Final
Rules].
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 GUIDANCE ON THE TEMPORARY ENFORCEMENT SAFE HARBOR FOR CERTAIN EMPLOY-
ERS WITH RESPECT TO PHSA § 2713 [hereinafter HRSA GUIDELINEs], available at http://www.
cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/preventive-services-guid-
ance-6-28-2013.pdf.
62 Amendments to Interim Final Rules, supra note 57, at 46,623.
63 Eric V. Hall, Religious Employer Exemption Under the Federal Mandatefor All Health Plans,
LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER (Sept. 28, 20n1), http://www.rrlaw.com/religious-employer-exemp-
tion-under-the-federal-mandate-for-all-health-plans- 9 -28-20ou. For comparison, see 42
191
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explained that the above definition will "reasonably balance the extension of
any coverage of contraceptive services under the HRSA Guidelines to as many
women as possible, while respecting the unique relationship between certain
religious employers and their employees in certain religious positions."64 HHS
accepted comments and considered alternative definitions until January 20,
2012, when HHS Secretary Sebelius announced the adoption of the religious
employer exemption as it was initially defined in the proposed amendment to
the interim final rules.65
Despite Sebelius's assertion that the final rule would have "no impact on
the protections that existing conscience laws and regulations give to health care
providers,"66 it immediately sparked intense public outrage-particularly from
the huge class of purported religious employers that failed to qualify for the
exemption under the narrow definition provided in the final rule. In effect,
under HHS's adopted definition of "religious employer," only one segment
of employer, such as churches and other "houses of worship," is exempt from
providing contraceptive coverage. 67
Contemporaneous with the issuance ofthe final rules, HHS issued guidelines
establishing a temporary enforcement safe harbor, under which "non-exempted,
non-grandfathered group health plans established or maintained by nonprofit
organizations" 68 that traditionally did not cover prescription contraceptives for
religious reasons, were granted an additional year to comply with the rules (i.e.
until the first plan year beginning on or after August 1, 2013).69 This was the
Obama Administration's attempt to reach out and "accommodate" religious
organizations that do not meet the requirements for exemption but nonetheless
make religious objections to covering contraceptive services, while still ensuring
that female employees receive contraceptive coverage without cost sharing.0
HHS announced its willingness to compromise by maintaining the adopted
definition of "religious employer" as required under the exemption, but ensuring
that
U.S.C. § zoooe-I(a) (2012) (providing that religious organizations may discriminate "with respect
to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the car-
rying on by such [religious organization] ... of its activities").
64 Id.
65 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, A Statement by U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.hhs.
gov/news/press/202pres/oI/20120x2oa.html.
66 Id.
67 See Contraceptive Coverage in the Health Care Law: What's New as ofAugust I, 2012?, NATL
WOMEN'S LAW CTR. (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/contraceptive-coverage-
health-care-law-what%E2%8o%99s-new-august-z--2o2; see also Amendments to Interim Final
Rules, supra note 57, at 46,623.
68 HRSA GUIDELINES, supra note 61, at 2-4.
6 9 Id.
70 See id
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[b]efore the end of the temporary enforcement safe harbor, the Departments
[of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury] will work with
stakeholders to develop alternative ways of providing contraceptive coverage
without cost sharing with respect to non-exempted, non-profit religious
organizations with religious objections to such coverage. Specifically,
the Departments plan to initiate a rulemaking to require issuers to offer
insurance without contraception coverage to such an employer (or plan
sponsor) and simultaneously to offer contraceptive coverage directly to the
employer's plan participants (and their beneficiaries) who desire it, with no
cost sharing. Under this approach, the Departments will also require that,
in this circumstance, there be no charge for the contraceptive coverage. .
. . The Departments intend to develop policies to achieve the same goals
for self-insured group health plans sponsored by non-exempted, non-profit
religious organizations with religious objections to contraceptive coverage.
In March 2012, HHS issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM) in order to express its intention to promulgate the above amendments
to the final regulations, and opened itself up to public feedback for a ninety-
day period.72 Despite this attempt to appease non-exempt, nonprofit religious
employers, religiously affiliated entities voiced their increased dissatisfaction
with the ambiguous and uncertain nature of the proposed accommodation.7 1
While it may have pacified some nonprofit employers who believe themselves
to be far enough removed from the equation that they are not actually
facilitating the use of contraceptives, many nonprofit employers who objected
to the law still feel that they are ultimately compelled to provide access to the
contraceptives. 74
71 Interim Final Rules, supra note 14 at 8728 (emphasis added).
72 Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501, 16,503,
16,5o8 (Mar. 21, 2012); see News Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Administration
Releases Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Preventive Services Policy (Mar. 16, 2012),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2s2pres/03/20x2036g.html.
73 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, United for Religious Freedom:
A Statement of the Administrative Committee of the United States Conference of Catholic Bish-
ops (Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/
Admin-Religious-Freedom.pdf ("One particular religious freedom issue demands our immediate
attention: the now-finalized rule of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services that
would force virtually all private health plans nationwide to provide coverage of sterilization and
contraception-including abortifacient drugs-subject to an exemption for 'religious employers'
that is arbitrarily narrow, and to an unspecified and dubious future 'accommodation' for other reli-
gious organizations that are denied the exemption.").
74 See Mark L. Rienzi, Senior Counsel for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Constitutional
Challenges: Religious Liberty and the HHS Mandate, Address at the Brendan F. Brown Lecture Se-
ries (Oct. 3, 2012), in 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & Po'Y 1, 4-5 (2012).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
II. CONSEQUENCES OF MAINTAINING SUCH A NARROw EXEMPTION
A. Scope of State Exemptions
As explained above, adoption of section 2713 of the PPACA meant that for
the first time, women would not have to pay a deductible or co-payment to get
prescription contraceptives. This "no cost" portion is really the only innovation,
for as one commentator has pointed out regarding the mandatory coverage
requirement, "as a legal matter, [and as] a constitutional matter, it's completely
unremarkable."" Employers have been required to provide contraceptive
coverage as part of their employee health benefit plans since the EEOC
decision in 2000.76
There are currently twenty-eight states requiring insurers that cover
prescription drugs to provide coverage of the full range of FDA-approved
contraceptive drugs and devices.77 Of those twenty-eight states, twenty allow
certain insurers and employers to avoid compliance by qualifying under a
"religious employer" exemption.7 ' HHS maintains that their definition of
"religious employer" is "consistent with [that of] most states that have such
exemptions." 9 However, a closer look at the breakdown of state exemptions
reveals that these definitions vary-while three states choose only to exempt
churches and church associations, nine states extend exemption status to
religious organizations (including at least some hospitals) and seven provide
some sort of middle ground." So in reality, HHS's definition is merely consistent
with the approach taken by the smallest groups of those states that have such
exemptions.
75 Julie Rovner, Rules Requiring Contraceptive Coverage Have Been in Force for Years, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Feb. IO, 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/201z/february/io/npr-
contraception-rules-in-force-for-years.aspx.
76 Id.; see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
77 State Policies in Brief Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, GUTTMACHER INST., http://
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/spib-ICC.pdf (last updated Sept. 1, 2013).
78 Id.
79 Amendments to Interim Final Rules, supra note 57 ("The definition of religious employer,
as set forth in the amended regulations, is based on existing definitions used by most States that
exempt certain religious employers from having to comply with State law requirements to cover
contraceptive services.").
8o State Policies in Brief Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, supra note 77. The Guttmacher
Institute divides the states into three categories: (I) those with "limited" refusal clauses (includes
only churches and church associations); (2) those with "broader" refusal clauses (includes churches,
church associations, religiously affiliated elementary and secondary schools, and some charities and
universities); and (3) those with "expansive" refusal clauses (includes religious organizations and at
least some hospitals). Id.
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B. State Decisions May Prove Poor Precedent
Right now HHS has such a narrow standard as to who operates a religious
ministry, Jesus himself couldn't pass muster.... His chief teaching about
serving one's neighbor highlights the Good Samaritan who took care of a
woebegone stranger by providing medical care, food and lodging. Jesus did
not say anything about checking the man's religious affiliation beforehand.
There was no catechism test afterwards. The point of the story is to help
anyone who needs help."
Out of the twenty states with religious employer exemptions, California,
New York, and Oregon are the only three states, to date, to craft them so.
narrowly that only churches and church associations are allowed to refuse
compliance with mandated contraception coverage.12 Interestingly, in the
past decade there have only been two legal challenges to state-mandated
contraception coverage-one in California and one in New York." Both states'
statutes are consistent in defining a "religious employer" for purposes of the
exemption:
A "religious employer" is an entity for which each of the following is true:
(A) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the entity.
(B) The entity primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of
the entity.
(C) The entity serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of
the entity.
(D) The entity is a nonprofit organization as described in Section 6033(a)(2)
(A)(i) or (iii), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended."
In both cases, the states'high courts upheld the challenged mandates." his is
significant in light of the fact that the federal mandate's definition of "religious
employer" for purposes of the exemption is identical to that of California, New
York, and Oregon."6
Despite the fact that no state contraception coverage mandate-with or
without a religious exemption-has ever been overturned by the judiciary,"
81 Sister Mary Ann Walsh,Jesus Won't Pass Muster at HHS, USCCB BLOG (Sept. I2, 2011, 10:24
AM), http://usccbmedia.blogspot.com/2o/o9/jesus-wont-pass-muster-at-hhs.html.
82 State Policies in Brief Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, supra note 77 (noting that Cali-
fornia, New York, and Oregon are the only three states to include a "limited" refusal clause, which
"allows only churches and church associations to refuse to provide coverage, and does not permit
hospitals or other entities to do so").
83 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P3d 67 (Cal. 2004); Catho-
lic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006).
84 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § I3 67 .25 (b)(i)(A)-(D) (West 2008); accord N.Y. INs. LAW
§ 3 221[d [16][A][] (McKinney zoo6). The cited provisions of the Internal Revenue Code exempt
'churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches" as well as "the
exclusively religious activities of any religious order" for purposes of filing annual returns. I.R.C. §
60 33(a)(2)(A)(i), (iii) (2012).
85 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P.3d at 95; Catholic Charities of the Diocese ofAlbany, 859
N.E.2d at 468.
86 Interim Final Rules, supra note 14, at 8728.
87 See, Nancy Frazier O'Brien, State contraceptive mandates widespread but not as broad as
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there have been several challenges to the federal contraception mandate in
the recent past and present," with more almost certain to be filed soon." In
light of the persistent opposition to the scope of the federal mandate's religious
exemption, as well as the weighty religious freedom questions at stake, it is
increasingly likely that the U.S. Supreme Court will soon step in to resolve
the issue. Regardless of whether the state courts ultimately reached the correct
decision, there are significant areas of weakness in the California and New
York high courts' opinions that demonstrate, at the very least, the inadequate
attention given to meritorious arguments. Because the New York Court of
Appeals decided Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio90 merely
two years after the California Supreme Court decided Catholic Charities of
Sacramento v. Superior Court" using largely the same argument to reach an
identical conclusion, it is sufficient to focus on the apparent ambiguities and
loopholes left in the California Supreme Court decision that renders it weak
precedent for the U.S. Supreme Court to follow.
Prior to 1999, state legislatures commonly offered a "conscience clause"
exemption to laws that conflicted with religious doctrine. 92 In many states, such
clauses were narrowed and renamed "refusal clauses" at about the same time the
United States saw the emergence of state contraceptive mandates.93 In 2001,
Catholic Charities of Sacramento filed suit against the State of California
to challenge one such "limited refusal clause" provided in the California
Women's Contraception Equity Act (CAWCEA).94 The CAWCEA sought to
eliminate sex discrimination in health care benefits by regulating the terms
of insurance contracts. While it did not affirmatively require any employer to
provide employees with coverage of prescription drugs, if they chose to include
such coverage, prescription contraceptives had to be included.95 In order to
HHS plan, CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/
cns/n1o3146.htm.
88 See, e.g., Complaint, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. CIV-12-rooo-HE, 2012
WL 5851136 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 12, zo2z); Complaint, Newland v. Sebelius, No. I:12-CV-uI2 3 , 2012
WL 1536098 (D. Colo. Apr. 30, 2012); Complaint, Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, No. iu-CV-
033 5 o-CMA-BNB (D. Colo. Dec. 21, 201); Complaint, Belmont Abbey Coll. v. Sebelius, No. i:i-
CV-os 989 , 2011 WL 8997549 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2011).
89 See News Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, U.S. Bishops Vow to Fight HHS
Edict (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/I2-o12.cfm ("The Catholic bishops are com-
mitted to working with our fellow Americans to reform the law and change this unjust regulation.
We will continue to study all the implications of this troubling decision.").
90 859 N.E.2d at 464.
91 85 P.3 d at 76.
92 See, e.g., Background: Religious Liberty, CAL. CATHOLIC CONF. (NOV. 28, 2011) (describing
the history of this legislative practice in California), http://www.cacatholic.org/index.php/issues2/
religious-liberty/i81-background-religious-liberty.
93 See State Policies in Brief Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, supra note 77.
94 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § i367.25(b) (West 2008); Catholic Charities of Sacramento,
85 P-3 d at 95.
95 HEALTH & SAFETY § 1367.25(a)(I).
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avoid curtailing employer's religious practices, the CAWCEA did provide a
narrow exception for "religious employers," under which those who met each
of four criteria (detailed above) could request a policy, including drug coverage
generally, but excluding coverage for "contraceptive methods that are contrary
to the religious employer's religious tenets."96
Catholic Charities is a nonprofit social service organization dedicated
to stewardship that provides, among other things, care to the elderly, food
and housing for the poor, and aid to the disabled." Because this charitable
organization did not qualify as a "religious employer"under the strict parameters
of the CAWCEAs exemption, yet desired to continue providing prescription
drugs to its employees, it sought a preliminary injunction to preclude
enforcement of the mandate.98 In March 2004, however, the California Supreme
Court validated the exemption (thus upholding the mandate).9 In doing so, it
rejected all eight constitutional challenges to the CAWCEA-three of which
pertained to the Establishment Clause, three to the Free Exercise Clause, one
specifically under the California Constitution, and one under the Fourteenth
Amendment.o10
Regarding its Establishment Clause Claim, Catholic Charities was
primarily concerned with the state's ability to distinguish an entity's secular
activities from its religious activities.' 0' This argument is particularly relevant
because it pertains directly to the four criteria outlined in the CAWCEAs
religious employer exemption.102 Specifically, Catholic Charities argued that
"the distinctions drawn by the Legislature between religious organizations
engaging in purportedly 'religious activities,' as opposed to those engaging
in purportedly 'secular activities,' are wholly contrary to Roman Catholic
teaching, which regards religious organizations, such as Catholic Charities,
as vital Roman Catholic religious ministries."103 In response, the state
supreme court emphasized that "[t]he United States Supreme Court has long
recognized that the alleviation of significant governmentally created burdens
on religious exercise is a permissible legislative purpose that does not offend the
establishment clause."104 In the state court's line of reasoning, the CAWCEAs
96 Id. § 13 67 .25(b). See supra text accompanying note 84.
97 Our Focus, ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF SACRAMENTO, http://www.diocese-sacramento.
org/socialserviceministry/social service.ministry.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
98 The preliminary injunction was denied by the trial court, and affirmed on appeal. Catholic
Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, No. Co37025, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001).
99 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P3 d at 76,79-
oo Id. at 73-74,76.
101 Id. at 79.
102 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13 6 7 .25 (b) (West 2oo8).
103 Maureen K. Bailey, Contraceptive Insurance Mandates and Catholic Charities v. Superior
Court of Sacramento: Towards a New Understanding of Women's Health, 9 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 367,
376 (2005).
104 Catholic Charities ofSacramento, 85 P-3d at 79 (citations omitted).
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"accommodation" of religion would be worthless if the state legislature could
not distinguish between religious and secular activities.10 s
The California Supreme Court's response was weak in several ways. First,
the court did not resolve the issue of the extent to which the government can
"premis[e] a religious institution's eligibility for an exemption" upon a certain
characterization."o6 Rather, the court merely stated that the legislature's action
in creating an exemption for certain religious entities was justified.
Second, the court found support for its decision in cases that could be
factually distinguishable from the situation in Catholic Charities. The court
seemed ready and willing to distinguish Espinosa v. Ruskto' on its facts,
which was cited by Catholic Charities in support of its Establishment Clause
claim. However, the court cites both Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the
Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos"os and East Bay Asian Local
Development Corp. v. Calhfornialo' as examples of cases in which the judiciary
upheld Congressional distinctions between secular and religious activities, the
court fails to take notice of the distinguishable facts in these cases: that the
courts in neither Amos nor East Bay had a need to distinguish between secular
and religious activities because they crafted their religious exemptions much
more broadly. This was a significant distinction the court should have made
between those cases and Catholic Charities ofSacremento.110
Finally, the Achilles heel in the opinion lies in its response to the Catholic
Charities' excessive entanglement argument. When Catholic Charities
contended that the law fostered "an excessive government entanglement with
religion," the court declined to address the larger issue, resolving the case
instead on its specific facts."' Catholic Charities had tried to bring the larger
105 Id.
1o6 Id. That is, the government may characterize an entity's activities as either secular or reli-
gious for purposes of the exemption.
107 Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477 (roth Cir. 1980); see Catholic Charities ofSacramento, 85 P.3d
at 79 ("Espinosa addressed the different problem of content-based prior restraints on speech").
1o8 See Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1978).
109 See E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, 13 P3 d 1122, 1128 (Cal. 2000).
no For example, the statute upheld by the court in East Bay stated that the mandate
shall not apply to a noncommercial property owned by any association or corporation
that is religiously afliliated and not organized for private profit, whether the corporation
is organized as a religious corporation, or as a public benefit corporation, provided that
both of the following occur:
() The association or corporation objects to the application of the subdivision to its
property.
(2) The association or cotporation determines in a public forum that it will suffer
substantial hardship, which is likely to deprive the association or corporation of
economic return on its property, the reasonable use of its property, or the appropriate
use of its property in the furtherance of its religious mission, if the application is
approved.
E. Bay Asian LocalDev. Corp., x3 P3d at 1140 (citing CAL. Gov'T CODE § 25373 (d) (West 2003)).
it Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P 3d at 8o.
198 [ Vol.102
2013-20141 "HOBBY-LOBBY"-ING FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 199
Constitutional issues before the court, conceding in its complaint that it did not
meet the four requirements for religious exemption. As the California Court
of Appeal noted,
Catholic Charities concedes that it does not meet any of the four criteria
necessary to qualify for the religious employer exception. It serves people
of all faiths and does not proselytize or attempt to inculcate those it serves
with its religious beliefs. Its employes,74 percent of whom are not Catholic,
come from a diverse group of religious faiths. It offers social services to the
general public that promote a just and compassionate society, reduce the
causes of poverty, and build healthy communities. And it is a nonprofit
public benefit organization exempt from federal income tax pursuant to
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, rather than section 6033(a)
(2)(A)(i) or (iii) of that code."1 2
So in that particular case, the California Supreme Court did not need to
affirmatively answer whether or not the government's exemption is "excessively
entangled" with religion. Instead, it merely suggested that
[t]he argument might have merit as applied to a hypothetical employer
that sought to qualify under the [CAWCEA]'s exemption for religous
employers ... but objected on establishment clause grounds to an entangling
official effort to verify that its purpose was the inculcation of religious vaues,
and that it primarily employed and served persons who shared its religious
tenets.1 3
Such an unresponsive decision opens the door to future claims by employers
attempting to distinguish themselves from Catholic Charities simply by
avoiding concession of their disqualification under the exemption.
The California Supreme Court did not end the exemption inquiry after
it rejected Catholic Charities' Establishment Clause claims. But while it
entertained the plaintiff's Free Exercise arguments, its second analysis proved as
insufficient as its first. Catholic Charities argued that the CAWCEA coerced it
to violate its religious beliefs in that "the CAWCEA, by regulating the content of
insurance policies, in effect requires employers who offer their workers insurance
for prescription drugs to offer coverage for prescription contraceptives." 114 The
court, applying the general rule articulated in Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, countered that "the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'""s
As with the court's Establishment Clause analysis, there are a couple of
discrepancies in the majority's opinion with regard to Free Exercise. After
Smith, it is clear that such neutral, generally applicable laws do not have to be
n12 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 1o9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176,183-84 (Cal.
Ct. App. 200).
113 Catholic Charities ofSacramento, 85 P 3d at 8o.
114 Id. at Si.
115 Id. (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990)).
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justified by a compelling state interest.16 However, the text of the rule in Smith
specifically pertains to an "individual.""' Indeed, the court in Catholic Charities
of Sacremento glosses over the fact that certain courts have expressly held that
religious "institutions" have no place in a Smith context."1 s But whether or not
Smith pertains to religious institutions, the fact is that the applicability of Smith
is not as obvious as the California Supreme Court seems to think it is."' If
Smith does not apply, the State of California would have to demonstrate a
compelling state interest in excluding only churches and church associations
from compliance with the contraceptive mandate in order to avoid a Free
Exercise violation under strict scrutiny analysis." While the court, apparently
playing devil's advocate, did contemplate such an interest, it again missed the
mark.
The purpose behind the CAWCEA was twofold: addressing the state's
problem of gender discrimination and improving access to prescription
contraceptives.12' The attempt to reduce discrimination seems to be a legitimate
goal in light of the legislature's finding that "women during their reproductive
years spent as much as 68% more than men in out-of-pocket health care costs."' 22
However, regarding access to contraception, the legislature found that "while
most health maintenance organizations (HMO's [sic]) covered prescription
contraceptives, not all preferred provider organization (PPO) and indemnity
plans did. As a result, approximately 10% of commercially insured Californians
did not have coverage for prescription contraceptives."123 To reiterate, ten
percent did not have contraceptive coverage. That is a very small number in
light of the fact that, as the dissent in Catholic Charities of Sacramento points
out, "[t] he insurance gap itself is not large, and Catholic Church employers can
constitute only a small percentage of that small percentage."124
116 Employment Div., Dep't. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
117 Id.
n8 See, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3 d 1299, 1303
(ith Cit. 2000); see also Carol M. Kaplan, Note, 7he Devil Is in the Details Neutral, Generally Appli-
cable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1070 (2000) (explaining that circuits
are split as to whether Smith applies to religious institutions).
19 Smith's applicability to institutions is an unsettled issue. See Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr.,
805 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (extending Smith to cover a Christian school).
120 Under Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 4o6-07 (1963), the Court determined that laws al-
legedly burdening the exercise of religion must be examined under strict scrutiny, meaning that the
government must show that the measure is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
121 Catholic Charities ofSacramento, 85 P.3 d at 74.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at ioS (Brown,J., dissenting).
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C. An Expansion to the Exemption for a Contraction ofPubic Outcry
What if the state courts were all too quick in their decision to validate
a narrowly crafted exemption? Finding loopholes in these two state opinions
does not itself support the need for a broader exemption. It merely casts a strong
shadow of doubt on the credibility of those who decided such an exemption
was not in violation of the constitutional rights of religiously affiliated entities.
But there is more value from the above analysis then might be apparent at first
glance. Both Catholic Charities ofSacramento and Catholic Charities ofthe Diocese
ofAlbany effectively illustrate just how strong the negative public sentiment
was almost ten years ago toward the state exemptions that so greatly influenced
HHS when it crafted the current religious employer exemption from the
PPACA.
With the passage ofPPACA section 2713 in 2010, nationwide dissatisfaction
with the narrowness of the religious employer exemption echoed Californians'
earlier responses to CAWCEA. Since the moment of the PPACAs inception,
the outcry over the contraception coverage mandate has only escalated.
Litigation began in November 2011 with the filing of Belmont Abbey College
v. Sebelius.1 25 Since then, the Becket Fund, which credits itself with leading the
charge against the mandate, has represented eight religiously affiliated colleges
and institutions, including Hobby Lobby.'26 To date, there are seventy-four
lawsuits challenging the mandate across the United States on behalf of over
200 plaintiffs.127
Immediately after the Obama Administration announced its plan for
"accommodation" and issued the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM) in March 2012, public feedback poured in to HHS during the
designated ninety-day comment period. In fact, it has been estimated that a
wide variety of stakeholders sent over 200,000 comments to the Department.12
While some comments specifically expressed preferences for alternative means
of accommodating religious employers, many weighed in on changing the
scope of the exemption itself.129
A review of the comments suggests that the Administration is likely to face
real economic and regulatory consequences if it maintains such a narrow scope
for religious exemption. Particularly intriguing are the following: (1) Employers
may not actually know the religious beliefs of those they hire or serve, which
precludes them from qualification under the current exemption's second and
125 See Complaint, Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius, No. I:I2-cv-ou6 9-ESH, 2011 WL
8997549 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2011).
126 See HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUs LIBERTY, http://
www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
127 Id. For a complete, updated list of all HHS mandate lawsuits, see http://www.becketfind.
org/hhsinformationcentral/.
128 Proposed Rules of February 2013, supra note 19, at 8459.
129 See id.
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third criteria. 30' These employers argue that they are forbidden from inquiring
about religious beliefs during the hiring process in order to comply with
various employment discrimination laws. 3' (2) If the HHS's narrow definition
of "religious employer" is maintained, employees may ultimately lose health
coverage altogether, as some employers express increased unwillingness to offer
coverage to which they take religious exception.' 32 In fact, one study estimated
that as of July 2012, around ten percent of employers would simply drop
coverage and send their employees to government-run exchanges.' 33 Another
study, conducted by the Congressional Budget Office, projected that as many
as twenty million fewer Americans could have employer-sponsored insurance
(ESI) by 2019.134 (3) Finally, many emphasized that other federal laws, including
the PPACA in its additional provisions, have broader conscience clauses and
religious exemptions than the HHS final interim rule, 3 s and expressed concern
that such a narrow definition sets a precedent for use in other areas of federal
and state law.136
The sheer number of lawsuits demonstrates widespread dissatisfaction and
now that the public has had an opportunity to express its discontent to the
federal government in an organized fashion, HHS may find that the apparent
consequences of maintaining the current religious employer exemption to
section 2713 of the PPACA outweigh the mandate's intended benefits-
access and equality-which have been consistently articulated throughout its
legislative history.
130 Id.
131 See Religious Accommodation in the Workplace: Your Rights and Obligations, ANTI-DEFAMA-
TION LEAGUE 3-4 (2012), http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/civil-rights/religiousfreedom/religfreeres/
ReligAccommodWPlace-docx.pdf ("Questions concerning an applicant's religion or the religious
holidays observed by an applicant are impermissible.").
132 Proposed Rules of February 2013, supra note 19, at 8458.
133 Alyene Senger, WhatAre the Odds Your Employer Will Drop Health Coverage?, THE FOUND-
RY (July 27,2012, 2:45 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/2012/07/2 7 /what-are-the-odds-your-employ-
er-will-drop-health-coverage. This particular study was conducted by Deloitte, the world's largest
management consulting firm.
134 Id. (citing CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CBO AND JCT's ESTIMATES OF THE EF-
FECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE OBTAINING EMPLOYMENT-
BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 19, 23 (2012), available at http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/o 3-iS-ACA.andInsurance_2.pdf).
135 See, e.g., Letter from Office of General Counsel, U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, to Ctrs.
for Medicare & Medicaid Services and Dep't of Health & Human Services, at 16 (Aug. 31, 20n1),
available at www.usccb.org/about/general-counsel/rulemaking/upload/comments-to-hhs-on-
preventive-serviceS-20n-08-2.pdf.
136 See id. at 9.
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III. SOLUTIONS: THE NEW "PROPOSED RULES" Do NOT PROPOSE ENOUGH
A. The Notice ofProposed Rulemaking.A Moderate App roach
At the very least, the religious employer exemption from the contraceptive
mandate should be expanded to afford exemption status to nonprofit entities.
In Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Justice Brown's dissent correctly points out
that the State of California failed to produce any substantive evidence that
broadening the religious employer exemption to exclude nonprofit religious
entities, like Catholic Charities, from its contraceptive mandate "would render
the whole scheme ineffective or would be so administratively burdensome as
to preclude enforcement."3 7 HHS may have run into a similar evidentiary
problem, as it announced on February 1, 2013, a new "Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking" (NPRM)13 8 that appears to accommodate many of the objections
raised by nonprofit religious institutions like Catholic Charities.'39 In fact, if
such proposed rules were passed, it would render both Catholic Charities of
Sacramento v. Superior Court and Catholic Charities of the Diocese ofAlbany v.
Serio moot.140
According to the text of HHS's proposed rules, there would be two principal
changes to the PPACAs contraception mandate:
First, the proposed rules would amend the criteria for the religious employer
exemption to ensure that an otherwise exempt employer plan is not
disqualified because the employer's purposes extend beyond the inculcation
of religious values or because the emp r serves or hires people of different
religious faiths. Second, the propose rules would establish accommodations
for health coversge established or maintained by eligible organizations, or
arranged by e gibe organizations that are religious institutions of higher
education, with religious objections to contraceptive coverage.14'
Regarding which previously non-exempt religious entities will meet the
requirements for recognition as "religious employers" and thus qualify for
the new proposed accommodation, HHS proposes to amend the definition
adopted in the 2012 final rules by deleting the first three prongs 42 and clarifying
137 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P 3d 67, io (Cal. 2004)
(Brown, J., dissenting).
138 See Proposed Rules of February 2013, supra note 59, at 8459.
139 Zapor, supra note 19.
140 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P.3d at 86; Catholic Charities of the Diocese of
Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2oo6). Catholic Charities, the nonprofit organization who
brought both suits, would likely qualfy for exemption under the NPRM, since its social work is
its main obstacle to qualification under the current four-part definition of "religious employer."
141 See Proposed Rules of February 2013, supra note 19, at 8459.
142 To reiterate, under the current religious employer exemption, the first three prongs that
must be satisfied are as follows: (i) employer must have the inculcation of religious values as its pur-
pose; (2) employer must primarily employ persons who share its religious tenets; and (3) employer
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application of the fourth. Thus, under the proposed rule,
[a]n employer that is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity ... would
be considered a religious employer for purposes of the religious employer
exemption. For this purpose, an organization that is organized and operates
as a nonprofit entity is not limited to any particular form of entity under
state law, but may include organizations such as trusts and unincorporated
associations, as well as nonprofit, not-for-profit, non-stock, public benefit,
and similar types of corporations."'
Who does this include? 'Ihis proposed rule seemingly clarifies that churches
and other houses of worship that the current exemption "intended" to cover
would not be disqualified solely because they provide charitable social services
to or employ people of other faiths.1" 'Ihe good news for Catholic Charities
is that it would almost certainly pass muster under this slightly expanded
definition. 'The rule cautions, however, that "for this purpose, an organization is
not considered to be organized and operated as a nonprofit entity if its assets
or income accrue to the benefit of private individuals or shareholders." 145 ThUS,
faith-based, for-profit entities-like Hobby Lobby-are still excluded from the
exemption.'" HHS's apparent overarching goal, with this moderate expansion
that eliminates the first three prongs of the current definition, is exclusively
to remove the need for any inquiry into an employer's purposes, the religious
beliefs of its employees, and the religious beliefs of those it serves.
The term "moderate" is accurate in describing the expansive nature of the
definition, for it only goes halfway in appeasing religious objectors to the
religious employer exemption. It could also be described as a "broader refusal
clause," as many refer to such religious exemptions. In fact, according to the
Guttmacher Institute's September 2013 survey of state insurance coverage of
contraceptives, there are seven states that currently provide a " 'broader' refusal
clauses that allows churches, associations of churches, religiously affiliated
elementary and secondary schools, and, potentially, some religious charities
and universities to refuse, but not hospitals."147 For example, Maine defines
must primarily serve persons who share its religious tenets. See Amendments to Interim Final
Rules, supra note 57.
143 Proposed Rules of February 2013, supra note 19, at 846.
144 Id. ("The Departments [of HHS, Labor, and Treasury] agree that the exemption should
not exclude group health plans of religious entities that would qualify for the exemption but for
the fact that, for example, they provide charitable social services to persons of different religious
faiths or employ persons of different religious faiths when running a parochial school. Indeed, this
was never the Departments'intention in connection with the 2011 amended interim final rules or
the 2012 final rules.").
145 Id
146 Shane Vander Hart, New Rules for HHS Contraceptives Mandate Excludes Hobby Lobby,
CAFFEINATED THOUGHTs: STIMULATING CHRISTIAN CONSERVATIVE NEWS & COMMENT (Feb. I,
2013), http://caffeinatedthoughts.com/2013/02/changes-in-hhs-contraceptives-mandate-do-no-
go-far-enough ("It is obvious that this proposed rule still leave [sic] businesses operated by people
of faith [outside] the mandate.").
147 State Policies in Brief Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, supra note 77.
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"religious employer" for purposes of its contraceptive coverage exemption as
[a]n employer that is a church, convention or association of churches or an
elementary or secondary school that is controlled, operated or principally
supported by a church or by a convention or association of churches
as defined in 26 United States Code, Section 3121 (w) (3) (A) and that
qualifies as a tax-exempt organization under 26 United States Code, Section
501(c) (3).148
While simplification of the definition of "religious employer" in the
proposed rules does not extend exemption status to universities or hospitals
like those in Maine's definition above, the proposed accommodation would do
so to an extent. The second significant change under the HHS's proposed rules
would be an accommodation that would "protect eligible organizations from
having to contract, arrange, pay, or refer for contraceptive coverage" to which
they take religious objection.'4 9 The process would be essentially as follows:
eligible organizations would inform their insurers that they qualify for the
accommodation. The insurers would then contact the organizations' employees
and explain that they would provide them with contraceptive coverage at no
cost through a completely separate insurance policy that is in no way connected
to the religious employer.'Ihe insurers could pass off that cost by paying less
than they otherwise would to participate in the new state health exchanges.s 0
For purposes of the accommodation, an "eligible organization" would be an
organization that:
(1) on account of religious objections, opposes providing coverage for some
or all of any contraceptive services otherwise required to be covered;
(2) is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity;
(3) holds itself out as a religious organization; and
(4) self-certifies that it meets these criteria in accordance with the provisions
of the final regulations.5 1
In addition to eligible organizations with insured and self-insured
group health plans, HHS would also propose that an eligible nonprofit
religious organization that offers a student health plan could avail itself of an
accommodation."Is2 This is surely good news for religiously affiliated universities,
such as Notre Dame, Catholic University of America, and the Archdiocese
148 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 23 3 2-J(2) (2000 & Supp. 2012). For more examples, see
ARK. CODE. ANN. § 23 -79 -n50 4 (b)(3), n02(3) (Supp. 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176G, § 40(c)
(LexisNexis 2005); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6ee (West 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3-I78(e)
(20); RI. GEN. LAws § 27- 4 1-59 (b) to 5 9 (d) (2oo8).
149 Proposed Rules of February 2013, supra note 19, at 8462.
150 See Kelly Kennedy, HHS Issues Proposed Contraception Coverage Rule, USA TODAY (Feb.
1, 2013, 5:44 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/o2/or/contraceptive-regula-
tion-proposal-hhs-sebelius/188
3165.
151 Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Women's Preventive Services Coverage and Non-
Profit Religious Organizations, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Feb. I, 2013), http://
www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/womens-preven-o2OI2o 3 .html.
152 Id.
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of New York, which were among some forty-three Catholic groups that
filed suit claiming that the federal government was forcing them to support
contraception and birth control or face steep fines.'s As Notre Dame expressed
in its lawsuit filed in the Northern District of Indiana, "[iun order to safeguard
their religious freedoms, religious employers must plead with the government
for a determination that they are sufficiently 'religious.' 154 The proposed rules
would alleviate this burden to a certain extent, and universities like Notre Dame
have a good shot at availing themselves of the accommodation.
As HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius stated in a press conference on the
same day as the announcement of the NPRM, "Today, the administration is
taking the next step in providing women across the nation with coverage of
recommended preventive care at no cost, while respecting religious concerns....
We will continue to workwith faith-based organizations,women's organizations,
insurers, and others to achieve these goals.""' Extending coverage to religious
charitable organizations like Catholic Charities, as well as to some universities
like Notre Dame, is most certainly a step in the right direction.
B. "Hobbling" Won't Reach Hobby Lobby in Time
Government poli under our constitution, history and statutory law has
recognized the rigt of citizens to be free from government compulsion of
conscience on such fundamental matters. The only acceptable outcome is
the complete repeal of the HHS mandate and the restoration of a thriving
marketlace where Americans can choose health care coverage consistent
with their beliefs.
1 6
A baby step, that is. While the Proposed Rules should certainly be adopted,
the religious employer exemption needs to be further expanded to include for-
profit institutions like Hobby Lobby for two key reasons: (1) the Proposed
Rules do not adequately address the public concern with the currently drafted
religious employer exemption and (2) basing exemption status on an artificial
nonprofit buffer is arbitrary and unmeritorious.
1. Insufficiency of the Proposed Rules.-As Kyle Duncan, General Counsel for
the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, points out: "Today's proposed rule does
nothing to protect the religious freedom of millions of Americans. . . . We
are extremely disappointed with today's announcement. HHS waited nearly
153 See Notre Dame, Catholic Groups Sue to Block Contraception Mandate, 22 WESTLAW J. INS.
COVERAGE, no. 34,June 1, 2012, at i.
154 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 3 :I2-CV-002 53 , 2012
VVL 6756332 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012).
155 Kennedy, supra note i5o.
156 SBA List Blasts So-Called HHS Mandate Policy "Update,"SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIs, http://
www.sba-list.org/newsroom/press-releases/sba-list-blasts-so-called-hhs-mandate-policy-
"update" (last visited October3, 2013) (quoting Marjorie Dannenfelser, President, Susan B. An-
thony List).
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a year and then gave us a proposed rule that still burdens religious liberty." 15 7
In the eyes of Duncan and many others, the Obama Administration's "new"
proposed accommodation is really no different than the old accommodation
proposed in March 2012."ss This is certainly a compelling argument. At the core
of the whole objection to the contraceptive mandate is the federal government's
requirement that religious employers fund contraception for their employees
against their religious beliefs. For any employer operating a business for-profit,
this would not change.
HHS now proposes to accommodate certain nonprofit schools, charities,
and other organizations not originally included as narrowly defined "houses of
worship."5 9 But HHS's goal is still to provide employees with access to contraception
at no cost to the employees themselves.'o The accommodation merely shifts the
financial burden from the individual employers to their insurance providers.
Specifically, HHS explains in the new proposed rules that health insurance
issuers would automatically provide separate, individual market contraceptive
coverage at no cost to plan participants. They claim "issuers generally would
find that providing such contraceptive coverage is cost neutral because they
would be insuring the same set of individuals under both policies and would
experience lower costs from improvements in women's health and fewer
childbirths."' 61
That looks nice on paper. But it is hard to imagine that insurance companies
will simply absorb those costs for nothing in return. It is more likely that they
will simply raise the premiums they charge their policyholders. While the new
rules technically prohibit insurers from attempting to "impose any premium, fee,
or other charge"162 for the coverage, insurers might be skeptical,' 6 and raise fees
elsewhere to make up for their costs. It seems that, either directly or indirectly,
employers will still ultimately bear the real cost of financing contraceptives.
157 Shane Vander Hart, New Rules for HHS Contraceptives Mandate Excludes Hobby Lobby,
CAFFEINATED THOUGHTS: STIMULATING CHRISTIAN CONSERVATIVE NEWS & COMMENTARY
(Feb. 1, 2013), http://caffeinatedthoughts.com/2OI3/02/changes-in-hhs--contraceptives-mandate-
do-no--go-far-enough.
158 Grace-Marie Turner, 7he HHS Mandate Isn't Fixed, NATL REV. ONLINE (Feb. I, 2013,
2:33 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/339562/hhs-mandate-isn-t-fixed-grace-marie-
turner ("While the administration has expanded the definition of institutions that could qualify for
a'religious employer exemption,'the'accommodation' is no different than the notice issued last year.
The administration still intends to force health-insurance companies to provide the coverage.").
159 Zapor, supra note 19.
16o Proposed Rules of February 2013, supra note 19, at 8460 ("The Departments aim to se-
cure the protections under section 2713 of the PHS Act that are designed to enhance coverage of
important preventive services for women without cost sharing while accommodating the religious
objections to contraceptive coverage of eligible organizations.").
161 Id. at 8463.
162 Id. at 8473.
163 See Louise Radnofsky, Contraception Opt-Out Offer: Employers who Object to Coverage
Could Shift Responsibility, Cost to Insurers, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2013, 2:o8 PM), http://online.wsj.
com/article/SBlooo4z4 12 788 732415620 45782 7 789 19 588 46414 .html.
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PPACA regulations would not only force employers to financially provide for
their employees'access to contraceptives,but also require insurance companies to
join in on the action or pay higher fees to participate in the new online markets
run by the government.'Ihis is exactly the argument that angry employers made
to the original accommodation! There simply would be no change.
2. 7heArtficialNonproftBuffer.-Under the proposed rule, for-profit employers
will still be forced to provide contraceptive coverage to insured employees despite
any religious objections simply because of their artificial, for-profit status.'64 The
question arises: Is a statutorily ordained, artificial, for-profit, corporate entity
a "religious employer," or is it a "non-religious" employer that just happens to
be owned and operated by religious people? The answer is simple-numerous
for-profit organizations provide comparable public services to those provided
by nonprofit entities, and those for-profits are no less "religious" simply because
they generate profits that accrue to private individuals or shareholders.'
HHS needs to look beyond the artificial for-profit/nonprofit barrier and
recognize that many for-profit organizations are run by real people with
religious beliefs that deserve as much respect under the law as they would
receive by operating their businesses in ways that happen to be financially
structured as nonprofit entities. If not, HHS and the Obama Administration
will find themselves facing the same economic and regulatory backlash that
spurred the announcement of these proposed rules. Perhaps most importantly,
many American employees will likely lose employer-sponsored health benefits
altogether, as for-profit employers seek a middle ground between violating
their personal religious doctrines and meeting higher staffing costs due to
penalties for not providing objectionable insurance coverage. As Judie Brown,
president of American Life League cleverly analogized: "This administration
treats our country's conscience like a jailor. If Obama now proposes releasing a
few prisoners while denying freedom to everyone else, he will find that people
of faith are not quite that easily fooled and will resist en masse."166
164 Proposed Rules of February 2013, supra note 19, at 8462 ("The Departments do not propose
that the definition ofeligible organization extend to for-profit secular employers. Religious accom-
modations in related areas of federal law, such as the exemption for religious organizations under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, are available to nonprofit religious organizations but not
to for-profit secular organizations. Accordingly, the Departments believe it would be appropriate
to define eligible organization to include nonprofit religious organizations, but not to include for-
profit secular organizations.").
165 See Hart, supra note 157 (quoting Majorie Dannenfelser of Susan B. Anthony List) ("There
must be no religious 'test'by the government as to who, and what type of entities, are entitled to a
conscience.").
166 Paul E. Rondeau, New Rules on HHS MandatesJust Another Obama Ploy?, WASH. TIMES
COMMUNITIES (Feb. 1, 2053), http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/common-
sense/20x3/feb/i/new-rules-hhs-mandates-just-another-obama-ploy/.
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CONCLUSION: GLUING THE PIECES TOGETHER
After HHS adopted an exceedingly narrow definition of"religious employer"
for purposes of an exemption to the contraceptive mandate in August 2011,
the Obama Administration received substantial negative feedback, primarily
from Catholic organizations outraged by the fact that their social work and
employment choices, in activities outside the church itself, disqualified them
from the religious employer exemption. In response, HHS announced a plan for
an "accommodation."HHS issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
in March 2012 that would allow some non-exempt, nonprofit entities to
provide contraceptive services to their employees indirectly though insurance
providers. Public feedback, however, suggested that significant negative
consequences would result if HHS were to maintain such a narrow scope for
religious exemption. Due to this negative public response, and persistence of
for-profit religious organizations that were not fooled by HHS's accounting
trick, HHS announced in February 2013 its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
that, if adopted, would accommodate a wider range of religious nonprofits-
such as certain religious schools and charities.
While adoption of these Proposed Rules is necessary, and certainly a small
step in the right direction, the religious employer exemption to the contraceptive
mandate needs to be further expanded to include for-profit organizations like
Hobby Lobby. The reason is simple and twofold: (1) 'The Proposed Rules do not
accurately address what is at the heart of the public concern with the currently
drafted exemption-that employers who take religious objection to the
provision of contraception to their employees should not be forced to comply
with the contraceptive mandate; and (2) conditioning "religious employer"
exemption on a statutorily ordained artificial nonprofit status is arbitrary and
unjust.
While plaintiffs like Notre Dame University may find relief under the
proposed rules, the current proposal would afford no relief to private, for-
profit companies owned or managed by religious shareholders and CEOs,
such as Hobby Lobby, who apparently would abandon their businesses before
surrendering their religious convictions. If exemption from the mandate is not
expanded to encompass such for-profit institutions, the same backlash that
sparked the announcement of the initial accommodation will surely follow. For
as Jesus asserted: "What shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world,
and lose his own soul?"167
167 Mark 8:36 (King James). See also Jeannie DeAngelis, Hobby Lobby and the Loss ofAmerica's
Soul, Am. THINKER (Dec. 30, 2012), http://www.americanthinker.com/2OI2/12/hobby1obby-and
the-loss-of americas-soul.html.

